though not always directly. In a little-known essay published posthumously, Adorno reflects upon the potential of music analysis. Reading notation, for example, requires "an analytical act"; analysis is "the prerequisite for an adequate performance," and aesthetic theories on music are "inconceivable without analysis." Perhaps most important of all, analysis "has to do with the surplus [das Mehr] in art," this surplus being the "truth content" of a work in so far as it goes beyond the mere facts. "No analysis," Adorno writes, "is of any value if it does not terminate in the truth content of the work, and this, for its part, is mediated through the work's technical structure" (emphasis added).2 Not all areas of theory need analysis, but by and large the majority of scholars who regard themselves as "theorists" or "analysts" or "practicing analysts" are often engaged in a more or less systematic inquiry into the structure of "the music itself." Analysis allows practitioners to come to grips with "the detail of a musical whole."3 Its rewards, like those of musical performance, stem from a hands-on experience. Although it makes claims about knowledge (here the differences between analysis and theory are noteworthy), an analysis does not merely produce a detached set of results available in verbal 298
form. This is neither to mystify the analytical process nor to claim for it transcendent status; it is rather to remind us of the easily forgotten fact that there are different kinds of musical knowledge, and that these are constituted in a complex variety of ways. Analysis, finally, is a relatively young discipline. According to Ian Bent, analysis "as a pursuit in its own right, came to be established only in the late 19th century."4 Although codified analytical methods date back at least to the eighteenth century, and although the refinement and formalization of techniques in our own century have depended directly on those earlier developments, it is perhaps more than merely coincidental that not until the 198os did the first comprehensive guides to analytical techniques in applicability of various techniques, for interrogating their foundations, and for assessing their limitations. Before this intra-disciplinary self-examination could play itself out, however, the young discipline of analysis came under attack. In "How We Got Into Analysis and How to Get Out" published in 1980, Joseph Kerman asked theorists some tough questions, and then proceeded to elevate his own brand of criticism to a position of privilege among the competing discourses about music.5 Although he recognized criticism's debt to analysis, Kerman nevertheless placed a higher premium on a research enterprise that did not terminate either in the gathering of facts or in the establishment of a work's internal relationships. His book of five years later, Contemplating Music, enabled a crystallization of the offending categories as "positivism" and "formalism."6 Although these terms carry considerable semantic and ideological baggage, their complex histories were subsequently suppressed in the drive to inform about the limitations of theory-based analysis. The charge of formalism was made because analysts inquired only into the connections between patterns within a piece; they did not deal with matters of affect and expression, with the "meaning" of music, with its cultural context. This unfortunate misrepresentation 299 of a hitherto complex theoretical enterprise made possible the prescription of an instant cure. To escape the dilemmas of formalism, you must attach the patterns you have observed to something else: a plot, a program, an emotional scenario, a context, an agenda, a fantasy, or a narrative. You must, in other words, problematize the gap between the musical and the extra-musical. The findings of formalist analysis are like a severed phallus; ideally, they should be re-attached.7
It was in this anti-formalist climate that the so-called "new musicology" emerged. To say that they are united in their anti-formalist stance may not please the new musicologists, for an essential part of their strategy is to deny any stable, collective identity, to insist on the impossibility of anchoring the first signifying relationship. Such denial is understandable in light of the different initiatives that are gradually coalescing into a "new musicology." But could such denial also be a trick aimed at ensuring that new musicologists are always able to shift their identities in order to, as it were, remain on top? And so we reach an impasse: theory-based analysis, which prides itself on leading the analyst to the "truth content" of a work as mediated by its "technical structure" (Adorno), which allows the musical mind to engage directly with the compositional elements themselvessuch analysis seems to be of limited utility in a project that interprets music as social discourse. The truth seems to be that new musicologists have so far not found a use for the surplus of detail that theorybased analysis produces. It would be helpful if this surplus was acknowledged either as a presence or as a problem. To object that theory-based analysis is a self-fulfilling and self-referential exercise is to pretend that tautology and circularity are ever avoidable in the criticism of art-they are not. And the analyst's failure to reach for an extramusical label, her failure to provide a "translation" of the anal-304 ysis, as if that which goes unlabelled or untranslated necessarily lies outside the bounds of "social discourse": these (and other) issues need to be aired. Referring generally to "new musicologists"-as I have done in the foregoing paragraphs-and drawing conclusions about their approach to analysis produces a limited and perhaps ambiguous set of results. By the same token, however, the habit of some new musicologists of ritually denouncing "formalist" analysis would gain greater credibility if the group of theorists, too, was understood not as a monolithic group espousing a single doctrine but as a highly diverse group motivated by a few shared concerns. We could go further. Within the discipline of theory, there exists a vast range of innovative inquiries that have been overlooked by new musicologists. Were it not for theorists' reticence about adopting new slogans, these initiatives would easily converge into a "New Theory." New musicologists' failure to acknowledge this work does not, of course, deny it a place in the discourses of the musical sciences. It only testifies to a willed amnesia on their part, a necessary strategy, perhaps, for redrawing the boundaries of the musical disciplines. 
